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The case of  Lebois v. Bulgaria once more 
raises the question of  the relationship between 
individual rights of  information on consular 
rights and consular communication and 
assistance rights, as determined by Article 36.1 (b) 
of  the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
of  1963 (VCCR ’63) and human rights law.1  
 
This connection has been previously 
established by the Inter-American Court of  
Human Rights (IACHR). In 1999, in an advisory 
opinion concerning death penalty cases, the 
IACHR stated that ‘failure to observe a detained 
foreign national’s right’ according to Article 36 
VCCR ’63 ‘is prejudicial to the due process of  law 
and, in such circumstances, imposition of  the 
death penalty is a violation of  the right not to be 
deprived of  life “arbitrarily”, as stipulated in the 
relevant provisions of  the human rights treaties.’2 
On the other hand, the International Court of  
Justice (ICJ), confronted with the domestic 
implementation of  consular rights of  foreign 
nationals in the United States since 1998 (Breard 
case, Paraguay v. United States of  America 3 ), 
rendered a first judgment in June 2001 in the 
LaGrand case (Germany v. Unites States of  America4), 
and in a more detailed manner in 2004 (in the 
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals case, Mexico v. 
United States of  America5). Notwithstanding the 
applicants’ claim, the ICJ avoided an express 
discussion of  the fundamental character of  those 
individual rights.6 
 
In Lebois v. Bulgaria, the European Court of  
Human Rights (ECtHR), unsolicited, took its 
time to write state-of-the-art provisions 
concerning international, European, and 
Bulgarian law on consular access and assistance. 
 
1  The UN General Assembly has already recognised 
consular communication rights of  foreign nationals as part 
of  human rights law: see Declaration on the Human Rights of  
Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of  the Country in Which They 
Live, A/RES/40/144, Art. 10, passed without vote on 13 
December 1985, although this does not specifically refer to 
those rights in the specific context of  an arrest or detention.  
2  IACHR, The Right to Information on Consular 
Assistance in the Framework of  the Guarantees of  the due 
Process of  Law: Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of  October 
1, 1999. Series A No. 16, para. 1. This advisory opinion has 
been cited afterwards by the ECtHR, for example in Öcalan 
v. Turkey, no. 46221/99, 12 May 2005, point 7. 
3 Proceedings were instituted on 3 April 1998. Paraguay 
It was precluded to take any further steps, given 
the absence of  any express allegation by the 
applicant and taking into consideration that the 
period during which the specific problem of  
non-respect of  consular rights arose was 
overridden by a timed-out conclusion. 
Nevertheless, the mere drawing of  a scenario of  
potential violation is already a step forwards in 
the path of  acknowledgement that consular 
rights of  foreign nationals are leaning towards a 
fundamental rights Mt. Olympus. 
 
On the eve of  a new ICJ decision 
concerning consular rights (Jadhav case, India v. 
Pakistan), this essay will comment upon Lebois in 
the context of  the—recent—case law 
developments by the ECtHR on consular rights 
of  foreign nationals. The European Court is 
actively contributing to a more general trend 
concerning the interaction between the so-called 
classical international law ruling the intercourse 
among nations and a more contemporary 
approach to a ‘humanized’ international law. The 
characterization of  the rights of  individuals to 
consular assistance, ruled by VCCR ’63 and as 
part of  the fundamental guarantees for the 
respect of  human rights, is currently on the rise. 
 
I. THE CASE OF LEBOIS V. BULGARIA: 
FACTS, CLAIMS, AND THE ECtHR’S 
ADJUDICATION 
 
On 11 October 2014, an application was 
lodged in the ECtHR Registry on behalf  of  Mr 
Vincent Lebois, a French national alleging 
fundamental rights violations while in detention 
discontinued the proceedings on 2 November 1998, after 
Mr Breard’s execution. The United States concurred, and 
the Court removed this case from its list on 10 November 
1998.  
4 Germany instituted proceedings on 2 March 1999, and 
the Court ruled on 27 June 2001. 
5 Mexico instituted proceedings on 9 January 2003, and the 
Court ruled on 31 March 2004. 
6 Scholarly literature on these cases is huge, although it is 
related to a variety of  points of  law; for instance, the 
compulsory character of  the ICJ directives for provisional 
measures and US domestic law procedures concerning 
review and reconsideration when an international law 
violation takes place in judicial proceedings. 
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in Sofia, Bulgaria 7 . The application was filed 
against Bulgaria, and when communicated to 
France, the French Government declined to 
exercise their right under Article 36.1 of  the 
Convention to submit written comments8. 
 
The alleged violations concerned a period 
of  detention in three different facilities. He was 
first detained from 24 to 25 January 2014 in the 
1st District Police Directorate in Sofia and then 
transferred to the Sofia Investigation Detention 
Facility from 25 January to 18 April 2014 (pre-
trial detention). He was later sent into custody—
from 18 to 24 April 2014—to Sofia Prison, where 
he was to serve his sentence.  
 
The decision of  the Court was delivered by 
the Fifth Section on 19 October 2017, declaring 
the claim partly inadmissible for non-exhaustion 
of  domestic remedies, partly inadmissible for 
out-of-time submission, and, ultimately, partly 
admissible due to a violation of  Article 8 of  the 
Convention, granting €1000 in respect of  non-
pecuniary damages, plus €400 in respect of  costs, 
expenses, and interests until the day of  payment 
by the respondent State, within a three-month 
period, at any stake. 
 
1.1. Once upon a time mistreatment 
was claimed 
 
Mr Lebois was born in France in 1986. In 
2013, he moved to Romania. He was arrested in 
Sofia on 24 January 2014 while trying to break 
into cars in order to steal items from them. ‘He 
was taken to the First District Police Station and 
placed under police detention.’ 9  ‘In the late 
afternoon or evening of  24 January 2014, the 
applicant was taken to a hospital for a medical 
examination, and then, at about 10 p.m. the same 
day, he was taken to a pre-trial detention facility 
in Sofia.’10 
 
‘[T]he next day, or one of  the following 
 
7 Application no. 67482/14. 
8 ‘Article 36. Third party intervention. 1. In all cases before 
a Chamber or the Grand Chamber, a High Contracting 
Party one of  whose nationals is an applicant shall have the 
right to submit written comments and to take part in 
hearings’, Council of  Europe, European Convention for the 
Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as 
days, the applicant was brought before the Sofia 
District Court with a view to a decision on 
whether he should be remanded in detention, and 
it was decided that he should remain in custody 
pending trial. A subsequent request for release 
apparently made by his counsel at the end of  
February 2014 was rejected as well.’11 
 
‘On 17 April 2014 the applicant and the 
prosecution entered into an agreement whereby 
he pleaded guilty and accepted to serve a 
sentence of  three months’ imprisonment. That 
same day the Sofia District Court approved the 
agreement, and the next day, 18 April 2014, the 
applicant was moved to Sofia Prison. Since his 
pre-trial detention was taken into account when 
calculating the amount of  time that he had to 
serve under his sentence of  imprisonment, he 
spent only six days there, until 24 April 2014, 
when he was released.’12 
 
Mr Lebois’s complaints comprised all his 
detention time, from police to pre-trial and after-
sentencing detention. But the specific facts 
alleged differed in every one of  those periods. 
Besides, he alleged simultaneously two different 
sets of  violations: Article 3 (Prohibition of  
torture) and Article 8 (Right to respect for private 
and family life) of  the Convention. 
 
The applicant considered the conditions 
during his detention were contrary to Article 3 of 
the Convention, which prohibits torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
 
During police detention, he complained 
that ‘he had not been given any food or drink or 
allowed to go to the toilet.’ 13  During pre-trial 
detention and in Sofia Prison conditions ‘had 
been very poor; and as a result of those 
conditions he had developed a staphylococcus 
infection, for which he had not been given 
proper medical treatment’14. 
 
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950. 
9 Lebois v. Bulgaria, no. 67482/14, 19 October 2017, para. 6. 
10 Ibid., para. 8. 
11 Ibid., para. 9. 
12 Ibid., para. 20. 
13 Ibid., para. 33 
14 Ibid. 
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Furthermore, he claimed a violation of 
Article 8 of the Convention, which states that 
‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private 
and family life […] and his correspondence.’ 
Paragraph 2 of this article states that ‘[t]here shall 
be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being 
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.’ 
 
He argued that ‘for twelve days after his 
arrest he had been unable to contact his family or 
anyone else and inform them of his deprivation 
of liberty, and that during his time in custody he 
had not been provided with sufficient 
possibilities to receive visits or to speak on the 
telephone to his family and friends.’15 The period 
covered in this claim encompasses police 
detention and the first ten days of pre-trial 
detention. 
 
1.2. And the ECHR granted —partial—
protection 
 
On 19 October 2017, the Fifth Section of  
ECtHR declared this application partly 
inadmissible based on non-exhaustion of  
domestic remedies in certain particulars and, to 
some extent, on untimely submission. 
 
15 Lebois v. Bulgaria, no. 67482/14, para. 48. 
16 Ibid., paras. 35–36. 
17 Ibid., para. 37. 
18 In Neshkov and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 36925/10 and five 
others, 27 January 2015. This new creative development by 
the ECtHR to face increasing demands on repeated human 
rights violations in a country, specifically after East and 
Centre Europe States accession and especially concerning 
Arts. 3 and 6 ECHR violations, has been considered a 
quasi-legislative tool and a dual-nature review between legal 
cassation and constitutional redress. There is a growing 
scholar body of  work on the relevance and impact of  pilot 
judgments. See, among others: L. Garlick, ‘Broniowski and 
After: on the Dual Nature of  Pilot Judgments’, in L. Caflish 
et al (eds.), Liber amicorum Luzius Wildhaber: Human rights, 
Strasbourg views (Kehl–Strasbourg–Arlington: N. P. Engel, 
2007), 177–192; A. Buyse, ‘The Pilot Judgment Procedure 
at the European Court of  Human Rights: Possibilities and 
Challenges’, Greek Law Journal 57 (2009): 1890–1902; Ph. 
Notwithstanding the above, the Court granted 
protection for an Article 8 violation as regards 
the final section of  the period covered by the 
application. 
 
1.2.1. The Article 3 submissions and the Court’s decision  
 
The Bulgarian Government considered 
that Article 3 violation allegations during the 
police detention period were out of time, as the 
application had been submitted after the six-
month period established in Article 35 of the 
Convention. The applicant had neither sought 
judicial review for the conducts during detention 
nor damages under the 1988 Act. Moreover, the 
Government alleged that the detention period 
was short enough, so it did not trespass the 
severity threshold for an Article 3 violation to be 
considered. The Government further contested 
the alleged bad conditions and poor medical care 
afforded in the pre-trial and post-conviction 
facilities16. 
 
On his part, the applicant established that 
he ‘has applied to the Court less than six months 
after his release, and argued that the different 
phases of his detention should not be considered 
in isolation’17, for the conditions in pre-trial and 
post-conviction facilities were also inadequate. 
Besides, he submitted that remedies under the 
1988 Act had already been considered ineffective 
by the ECHR in a pilot judgment18. On the other 
hand, the new remedies introduced by the 
Bulgarian Government in 2017 after the said 
Leach, H. Hardman, and S. Stephenson, ‘Can the European 
Court’s Pilot Judgment Procedure Help Resolve Systemic 
Human Rights Violations? Burdov and the Failure to 
Implement Domestic Court Decisions in Russia’, Human 
Rights Law Review 10, no. 2 (2010): 346–359, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngq011; Ph. Leach, H. 
Hardman, S. Stephenson, and B. Blitz, Responding to 
Systematic Human Rights Violations: An Analysis of  ‘Pilot 
Judgments’ of  the European Court of  Human Rights and Their 
Impact at National Level (Antwerp–Oxford–Portland: 
Intersentia, 2010); J. Abrisketa Uriarte, “Las sentencias 
piloto: el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, de juez 
a legislador”, Revista Española de Derecho Internacional 65 
(2013): 73–99; D. Haider, The Pilot Judgment Procedure of  the 
European Court of  Human Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff  
Publishers, 2013); L. Glas, ‘The Functioning of  the Pilot-
Judgment Procedure of  the European Court of  Human 
Rights in Practice’, Netherlands Quarterly of  Human Rights 34, 
no. 1 (2016): 41–70. 
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pilot judgment did not consider an Article 8 
violation allegation for the breach of his right to 
private and family life to be valid in this case. 
 
The Court recalled that it had already 
established in June 2017 that remedies set in 
place by Bulgaria in early 2017 ‘to provide redress 
in respect of inhuman or degrading conditions in 
correctional and pre-trial detention facilities’ 
should also ‘be used by pre-trial detainees and 
prisoners who had been released before its 
introduction and had in the meantime 
complained to the Court about the conditions of 
their detention’ 19 . Therefore, the Court 
concluded that ‘it is open to the applicant to seek 
compensation under the relevant provisions of 
the 2009 Act, as amended in 2017.’20 The Court 
underscored that the difficulties in doing so ‘due 
to his being a foreigner who does not speak 
Bulgarian do not exempt him from the obligation 
to exhaust domestic remedies’21. 
 
But the 2017 reformation of the 2009 Act 
only covered pre-trial detention and detention 
under a sentence of imprisonment22, so the Court 
stated that ‘insofar as he complained about the 
conditions of his police detention, the applicant 
did not have at his disposal an effective domestic 
remedy. His complaint in that respect is, 
however, inadmissible for failure to comply with 
the six-month time limit under Article 35.1 of the 
Convention’ 23 . To reach this conclusion, the 
Court explains the previous jurisprudence in 
terms of a ‘continuing situation’ as regards 
violations occurred in successive detention 
facilities, stating that ‘the conditions in those 
facilities, as well as the nature of his grievances in 
respect of them’ must not substantially differ. 
The Court considered this was not the case; thus, 
the time limit for the police detention conditions 
did not run from the date of his release (24 April 
2014), but rather from the day he was transferred 
to the pre-trial detention facility (24 January 
2014). Accordingly, when he submitted his 
 
19 Lebois v. Bulgaria, no. 67482/14, para. 39, specifically in 
Atanasov and Apostolov v. Bulgaria, nos. 65540/16 and 
22368/17, paras. 44–68, 27 June 2017. 
20 Ibid., para. 41. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Lebois v. Bulgaria, no. 67482/14, para. 43. 
application (11 October 2014) the six-month 
period had already elapsed. 
 
1.2.2. The Article 8 submissions and the Court’s decision 
 
The Bulgarian Government asserted that 
the applicant’s failure to recharge his phone card 
could not be imputed to the authorities, and no 
interference with Article 8 could be attributed in 
this case as a result: he had received family and 
friends’ visits, along with those of his legal 
counsellor and consular staff. He had received 
parcels on two occasions; therefore ‘no undue 
restrictions on his contacts with the outside 
world’ had taken place24. He also alleged the non-
exhaustion of local remedies. 
 
The applicant said it was twelve days before 
he could get in touch with the Consulate of  
France in Sofia, and even later with his family and 
friends. Furthermore, the contacts were brief, 
and their frequency did not increase during the 
subsequent period of  detention25. 
 
The Court deemed that any eventual 
violation of  Article 8 during his arrest and police 
detention constituted an out-of-time allegation: 
to comply with the six-month time limit, it 
should have been raised ‘not later than 5 August 
2014, but only did so on 11 October 2014’. Yet, 
before concluding, the Court considered that the 
facts of  the case raised more than a ‘potentially 
serious issue under Article 8 of  the Convention’26, 
taking into account that ‘[a]s evidenced by that 
provision, as well as the other relevant provisions 
of  Bulgarian law, European Union law and 
international law […], that obligation [access to 
his family] takes on an added importance when 
the detainee is an alien whose family may be in a 
different country.’27 We will return to this issue 
later, for it constitutes our core concern. 
 
For the later period of  detention in the pre-
trial facility, which lasted until 18 April 2014, the 
time limit was still not due on 11 October 2014, 
23 Ibid., para. 44. 
24 Ibid., para. 51. 
25 Ibid., para. 52. 
26 Ibid., paras. 55 & 54. 
27 Ibid., para. 53. 
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when the application was filed. The Court then 
deliberated whether domestic remedies had been 
exhausted before the filing of  said application. It 
stated that the Government had not clarified 
which were the non-exhausted remedies and 
what redress they could have provided to the 
applicant, so it declared the application 
admissible28  and considered the merits of  this 
case. 
 
The Court recalled its previous 
jurisprudence regarding the legality of certain 
constraints on the right to family life when 
someone is remanded in custody: the limitations 
must be ‘in accordance with the law’ and 
‘necessary in a democratic society’ 29 . In the 
present case, the Court considered that the 
aforementioned requisite ‘in accordance with the 
law’ was not respected, given that the rules 
governing visiting rights and the use of a 
telephone ‘were not accessible in a standardised 
form’ and were not brought to the applicant’s 
attention30. Thus, without turning into an analysis 
of a limitation ‘necessary in a democratic society’, 
the Court declared the existence of a violation of 
Article 8. 
 
II. WHAT THE CASE WAS FINALLY 
NOT ABOUT DEMANDS ATTENTION 
 
As the Court considered that no 
‘continuing situation’ existed throughout the 
whole detention period of  Mr Lebois, it could 
not enter into the merits concerning the violation 
of  rights during the very first hours of  detention, 
as it was barred by the out-of-time filing of  the 
allegation. 
2.1. The ‘almost obiter dictum’ 
 
The Court dared to go quite far by affirming 
obiter dictum that the ‘state of  affairs raised a 
potentially serious issue under Article 8 of  the 
Convention, but came to an end more than six 
months before the applicant lodged his 
application’ (emphasis added). 
 
The Court’s suspicions were based on the 
 
28 Ibid., para. 58. 
29 Ibid., paras. 61–64. 
30 Ibid., paras. 65–67. 
allegation by the applicant that ‘the authorities 
had not done enough to enable him to inform his 
family of  his arrest and placement in detention.’31 
The Court underlined the fact that not speaking 
Bulgarian was an aggravating circumstance, as 
interpretation facilities were apparently absent. 
For the Court, this ‘raises an issue under the 
authorities’ positive obligations flowing from 
Article 8 of  the Convention’ concerning the 
detainee’s early contact with his family: this is a 
situation of  distress for the family (disappearance 
of  the detainee) and of  extraordinary importance 
to prevent arbitrary detention32. 
 
As stated above, the case pertains to the 
contact between Mr Lebois and his family, since 
he ‘was not able to inform anyone of  his 
deprivation of  liberty for twelve days, until, with 
the help of  a co-detainee, he obtained access to a 
telephone and contacted the consulate of  France 
in Sofia on 5 February 2014, which in turn 
informed his parents of  his arrest and 
detention’ 33 . The applicant never claimed 
violation of  his right to be informed of  consular 
rights or his right to contact national consular 
authorities, ‘without undue delay’, as the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations of  1963 
(VCCR ’63) establishes in Article 36.1 (b). 
 
However, moving further and beyond this 
family contact, the Court included the 
international norms ruling consular contact 
rights between an alien detainee and his national 
consular officer in its analysis of  the ‘Relevant 
domestic law and practice’, under the heading of  
‘the obligations to inform other that someone 
has been placed in pre-trial detention and to 
enable pre-trial detainees to contact their families 
and relatives’. 
 
Specifically when stating the law and after 
taking notice that domestic law (Article 63, para. 
7 of  the 2005 Code of  Criminal Procedure) ruled 
that ‘after placing an accused in pre-trial 
detention, the authorities must notify (a) his or 
her family; (b) his or her employer, unless the 
accused opposes that; and (c) the Ministry of  
31 Ibid., paras. 53–54. 
32 Ibid., para. 53. 
33 Ibid., para. 54. 
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Foreign Affairs, if  the accused is a foreign 
national’, the Court pointed out that Bulgaria had 
acceded in 1989 to the VCCR ’63, whereby 
Article 36.1 (b) specifically lays down ‘the 
obligations to (a) inform a consular post if  a 
national of  the sending State is arrested or 
detained; (b) forward without delay any 
communication addressed to that post by the 
detainee; and (c) inform the detainee without 
delay of  those rights. The Convention was 
published in the State Gazette on 25 May 1999, 
and is thus, by virtue of  Article 5.4 of  the 1991 
Constitution, part of  Bulgarian domestic law’34. 
 
In the same vein, the Court identified a 
later Ministry of  Internal Affairs Act that ‘came 
into force on 1 July 2014’ (after the facts of  the 
case occurred), which provides that ‘an order for 
police detention must set out the detainees’ rights 
to contact the consular authorities of  their State 
of  nationality if  they are not Bulgarian nationals’, 
further detailing other domestic rules concerning 
early contact of  detainees with a person of  their 
choosing. 
 
A specific right to inform the family or a 
relative is established again in Section 243 (1) of  
the 2009 Act, whereby the accused is put in pre-
trial detention, having to sign a declaration in case 
he refuses to contact his family. This same act 
provides the rights to visits, telephone contacts, 
and ‘to be informed of  their right to contact the 
diplomatic or consular authorities of  their State 
of  origin, and must immediately be provided 
with facilities to do so’35. 
 
The ECtHR incorporates Directive 
2013/48 of  the European Union (EU) of  22 
October 2013 to the state of  the law, with a 
 
34 Ibid., paras. 23–24. Art. 36.1 of  the VCCR ’63, under the 
heading ‘Communication and contact with nationals of  the 
sending state’, expressly states that ‘1. With a view to 
facilitating the exercise of  consular functions relating to 
nationals of  the sending State: […] (b) if  he so requests, 
the competent authorities of  the receiving State shall, 
without delay, inform the consular post of  the sending 
State if, within its consular district, a national of  that State 
is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending 
trial or is detained in any other manner. Any 
communication addressed to the consular post by the 
person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also 
be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said 
transposition deadline of  27 November 2016, 
which states that detainees have a right to ‘(a) 
have a third person informed of  the deprivation 
of  liberty, (b) communicate, while deprived of  
liberty, with third persons, and (c) have the 
consular authorities of  one’s State of  nationality 
informed of  the deprivation of  liberty without 
undue delay and to communicate with those 
authorities’36. Bulgaria had not yet, at the date of  
judgment, approved the 2016 transposition-
amendment of  the 2005 Code of  Criminal 
Procedure in that sense. Those rights were 
already established under the Ministry of  Internal 
Affairs Act of  2014. In any case, the invocation 
of  the EU Directive in the judgment should be 
regarded as legally irrelevant, for it was not 
applicable to the case. Nevertheless, the Court of  
Justice of  the European Union (CJEU) 
jurisprudence has detailed the obligations of  a 
member State as arising out of  EU Directives, in 
force but pending timely transposition. This 
represents the situation as regards EU Directive 
2013/48 in the present case37. None of  this is 
considered by the ECtHR. Mentioning this 
directive only served the purpose of  stressing the 
connection between consular rights and the right 
to family contact, since they are both ruled by the 
same directive. There is no mention, however, of  
Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to 
information in criminal proceedings, which 
includes the right to information on consular 
rights38.  
 
Let us summarise Mr Lebois’s case related 
rights according to Bulgarian law: 
 
Concerning his right to family contact 
following detention, as per the 2006 Act, there 
existed an obligation on the part of  the detaining 
authorities shall inform the person concerned without 
delay of  his rights under this sub-paragraph.’ 
35 Lebois v. Bulgaria, no. 67482/14, para. 26. 
36 Ibid., para. 27. 
37  An obligation of  not impeding the object of  the 
Directive had already been established by the European 
Union Court before the end of  the transposition period. 
On this question, see V. Faggiani, Los derechos procesales en el 
espacio europeo de justicia penal (Navarra: Aranzadi, 2017), 218–
224. 
38 Directive 2012/13/EU of  the European Parliament and 
of  the Council of  22 May 2012 on the right to information 
in criminal proceedings, OJ L 142, 1.6.2012. 
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authority to communicate the detention to the 
person specified by the detainee. This became a 
detainee right only with the enactment of  the 
Ministry of  Internal Affairs Act of  2014, in force 
on 1 July, sometime after the detention, trial, 
sentence, and release of  Mr Lebois. That said, the 
right to contact a relative and the right to visits 
and telephone contacts were currently applicable, 
given that the accused was sent to pre-trial detention 
in accordance with the 2005 Code of  Criminal 
Procedure and the 2009 Act. These pre-trial 
rights would become effective as rights to be 
granted immediately upon detention and 
independently of  a pre-trial decision by virtue of  
the EU Directive 2013/48 (transposition 
deadline ended 27 November 2016, so it was not 
applicable on the date of  Mr Lebois’s detention). 
 
As for the right to be informed of  consular 
rights and the right to contact consular authorities, 
they are now applicable from detention and 
without undue delay by virtue of  the CVRC ’63 
being part of  Bulgarian domestic law and, after 1 
July 2014, by virtue of  the Ministry of  Internal 
Affairs Act of  2014, reinforced by the EU 
Directive 2013/48 (although transposition 
deadline of  the latter ended on 27 November 
2016). 
 
What was, then, the interest of  the ECtHR 
in defining consular rights in those cases where 
their violation has not been raised by the 
applicant?  
 
If  the Court went obiter dictum to state 
that the circumstances of  the case ‘raised a 
potential issue under Article 8 of  the 
Convention’, the state of  the law concerning 
consular rights may be perceived as an almost 
obiter dictum, in the sense that the Court may 
have implied the idea that consular rights were 
potentially violated as well. Although the 
applicant did not raise the question and neither 
alleged a possible Article 6 violation thereof—
right to due process—nor connected consular 
rights violations to family contact, later allowed 
by the Bulgarian authorities, the Court asserted in 
very general terms that ‘as evidenced by that 
provision [Section 249 of  the 2009 Act], as well 
 
39 Ibid., para. 53. 
as the other relevant provisions of  Bulgarian law, 
European Union Law and international law […], 
that obligation [to enable the detainee to contact 
his or her family promptly] takes on an added 
importance when the detainee is an alien whose 
family may be in a different country.’39 
 
In that reference to international law, the 
only norm—apart from European Union law, 
mentioned separately—expressly included by the 
ECtHR is the VCCR ’63, although this 
Convention does not mention or relate to the 
right to contact a relative, the right to visits by 
family and friends, or the right to telephone calls, 
whose violation is the main object of  Mr Lebois’s 
application. There was no need, therefore, to 
refer to the VCCR ’63. 
 
Domestic law concerning the right to 
family contact was enough to weigh up—as it 
did—a potential Article 8 violation. The EU 
Directive 2013/48 connects both series of  rights 
(consular and family contact) in the same text, 
along with the right of  access to a lawyer, even 
though this norm was not applicable to the case 
due to time-related matters. It is clear that, for the 
ECtHR at least, a connection exists between this 
case and the VCCR ’63, a link between consular 
and family contact rights. 
 
The reasons for the intertwining of  
consular rights with other human rights 
violations must be looked into in further case law. 
We clearly perceive a smooth movement by the 
ECtHR to increasingly consider violations of  
consular rights of  foreign nationals as related to 
certain human rights violations, as we shall see 
next.  
 
2.2. The ECtHR has already drawn a case-
law scenario 
 
This is not the first time both consular 
assistance rights and Article 36.1 (b) VCCR ’63 
have been mentioned in ECtHR case law. The 
Court has referred previously to these on a few 
different occasions. 
 
In M. and Others v. Italy and Bulgaria, the 
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applicants considered Bulgaria’s concurrent 
responsibility (the bulk of  the allegations were 
addressed to establish Italy’s responsibility, where 
the facts occurred), given that no consular 
authority was present during the interrogation in 
police detention facilities40. The judgment of  the 
Court during a Grand Chamber decision in 2012 
rejected the allegations and considered that the 
case was exclusively conducted against Italy. The 
Court missed the chance to comment upon the 
nature of  the individual rights to consular 
assistance and the existence of  a corresponding 
duty by the sending State. In fact, a 
misunderstanding on the part of  the Court is 
present obiter dictum, as it established that ‘the 
Convention organs have repeatedly stated that 
the Convention does not contain a right which 
requires a High Contracting Party to exercise 
diplomatic protection, or espouse an applicant’s 
complaints under international law or otherwise 
to intervene with the authorities of  another State 
on his or her behalf ’, citing its previous case law 
on the matter. The applicant’s allegations did not 
concern diplomatic protection, as an expression 
of  a request for international responsibility, but 
rather the consular communication rights of  the 
foreign national under Article 36.1 (b) VCCR ’63 
41.  
In El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of  
Macedonia42, the Court was confronted with the 
 
40 M. and Others v. Italy and Bulgaria, [GC], no. 40020/03, 
Judgment of  31 July 2012, 119. 
41 See ibid., para. 127. The IACHR advanced the point of  
a duty of  the sending State to grant consular assistance, but 
finally did not address the question in substance. See 
IACHR, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance 
in the Framework of  the Guarantees of  the due Process of  
Law: Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of  October 1, 1999, 
paras. 126–127. 
42 El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of  Macedonia, [GC], 
no. 39630/09, Judgment of  13 December 2012. There is a 
growing bibliography on the case, yet it is not specific to 
consular assistance rights. See Cerna, Ch. M., ‘Introductory 
note to the European Court of  Human Rights: El-Masri v. 
The Former Yugoslav Republic of  Macedonia’, International 
Legal Materials 52, no. 2 (2013): 558–622, doi 
10.5305/intelegamate.52.2.0558.  
43  This raises a significant number of  legal problems. 
Literature on the topic is important, among which we may 
find (from older to newer): J. Santos Vara, ‘Extraordinary 
Renditions: The Interstate Transfer of  Terrorist Suspects 
Without Human Rights Limits’, in M. J. Glennon and S. Sur 
(eds.), Terrorisme et droit international (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff  Publishers, 2008), 551–583; P. Gaeta, 
problem of  extraordinary renditions in the 
aftermath of  the 11 September attacks and the 
so-called fight against terrorism, in which 
European States participated in the CIA program 
to transfer persons suspected of  terrorism to the 
jurisdiction of  the United States of  America, 
either contributing to irregular detentions or 
permitting the unrestricted use of  European 
States’ airspace for rendition flights43. The El-
Masri case was of  utmost relevance: the United 
Nations Office of  the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Interights, Redress, the 
International Commission of  Jurists, and 
Amnesty International were all granted leave to 
intervene in the written procedure. The affair, 
first allocated to the Fifth Section (2010) and 
then to the First Section (2011), was later referred 
to the Great Chamber (2012). 
 
In this case, a German national ‘had been 
subjected to a secret rendition operation, namely 
that agents of  the respondent State [the former 
Yugoslav Republic of  Macedonia] had arrested 
him, held him incommunicado, questioned and 
ill-treated him, and handed him over at Skopje 
Airport to agents of  the United States Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) who had transferred 
him, on a special CIA-operated flight, to a CIA-
run secret detention facility in Afghanistan, 
where he had been ill-treated for over four 
‘Extraordinary renditions e giurisdizionie italiana nei 
confronti degli agenti statunitensi coinvolti nel c.d. caso 
Abu Omar’, Rivista di diritto internazionale 96, no. 2 (2013): 
530–537; M. Mussi, ‘Extraordinary Renditions as Enforced 
Disappearances? The Jurisprudence of  the European 
Court of  Human Rights’, Diritti umani e diritto internazionale 
7, no. 2 (2013): 365–378; N. Napoletano, ‘“Extraordinary 
renditions”, tortura, sparizioni forzate e “diritto alla verità”: 
alcune riflessioni sul caso “El-Masri”’, ibid.: 331–364; F. 
Fabbrini, ‘The European Court of  Human Rights, 
Extraordinary Renditions and the Right to the Truth: 
Ensuring Accountability for Gross Human Rights 
Violations Committed in the Fight Against Terrorism’, 
Human Rights Law Review 14, no. 1 (2014): 85–106; P. 
Sferrazza Taibi, ‘Entregas extraordinarias en Europa. Un 
comentario a las sentencias del Tribunal Europeo de 
Derechos Humanos: Al Nashiri vs. Polonia y Abu 
Zubaydah vs. Polonia’, Revista de Derechos Fundamentales, no. 
12 (2014): 163–199; J. Davis, ‘Uncloaking Secrecy: 
International Human Rights Law in Terrorism Cases’, 
Human Rights Quarterly 38, no. 1 (2016): 58–84; A. Liguori, 
‘Extraordinary Renditions nella giurisprudenza della Corte 
europea dei diritti umani: il caso Abu Omar’, Rivista di diritto 
internazionale 99, no. 3 (2016): 777–796. 
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months. The alleged ordeal lasted between 31 
December 2003 and 29 May 2004, when the 
applicant returned to Germany’44. 
 
In 2012, the Court ruled that the detention 
had been irregular for a number of  circumstances: 
‘There was no court order for the applicant’s 
detention’; ‘[h]is confinement in the hotel was not 
authorised by a court. Furthermore, the 
applicant’s detention in the respondent State has 
not been substantiated by any custody records’; 
‘[d]uring his detention in the respondent State, 
the applicant did not have access to a lawyer, nor 
was he allowed to contact his family or a 
representative of  the German embassy in the 
respondent State, as required by Article 36 § 1 (b) 
of  the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations’; ‘[f]urthermore, he was deprived of  
any possibility of  being brought before a court to 
test the lawfulness of  his detention.’ ‘His 
unacknowledged and incommunicado detention 
means that he was left completely at the mercy 
of  those holding him […]. Lastly, the Court finds 
it wholly unacceptable that in a State subject to 
the rule of  law a person could be deprived of  his 
or her liberty in an extraordinary place of  
detention outside any judicial framework, as was 
the hotel in the present case. It considers that his 
detention in such a highly unusual location adds 
to the arbitrariness of  the deprivation of  
liberty.’45 
 
Thus, the Court concluded that ‘during 
that period the applicant was held in 
unacknowledged detention in complete disregard 
of  the safeguards enshrined in Article 5, and that 
this constitutes a particularly grave violation of  
his right to liberty and security as secured by 
Article 5 of  the Convention’ 46 . This case was 
cited and confirmed in 2016 in Nasr and Ghali v. 
Italy47. 
 
Substantially in the El-Masri case, the 
VCCR ’63 rights mentioned were merely one out 
of  several guarantees integrated in a violation of  
Article 5 of  the ECHR (right to liberty and 
 
44 El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of  Macedonia, para. 3. 
45 Ibid., para. 236. 
46 Ibid., para. 237. 
47 Nasr and Ghali v. Italy, no. 44883/09, 2016, citing the El-
Masri case more than thirty times. 
security). That said, the VCCR violation—by 
itself  and on its own—may have not trespassed 
the gravity threshold to be considered as an 
Article 5 violation, but concurrently with other 
failing guarantees, it allowed the Court to assert 
that violation. 
 
Further on, the Article 5 violation (and an 
added Article 3 violation—prohibition of  torture) 
in the El-Masri case compromised the right of  the 
applicant to private and family life. For the Court, 
‘an essential object of  Article 8 is to protect the 
individual against arbitrary interference by the 
public authorities’; therefore, ‘[h]aving regard to 
its conclusions concerning the respondent State’s 
responsibility under Articles 3 and 5 of  the 
Convention, the Court considers that the State’s 
actions and omissions likewise engaged its 
responsibility under Article 8 of  the Convention. 
In view of  the established evidence, the Court 
considers that the interference with the 
applicant’s right to respect for his private and 
family life was not “in accordance with the 
law”.’48 
 
As we have explained above, Article 8 of  
the ECHR—right to private and family life; but 
more specifically, the right to family life—is the 
object and purpose in the Lebois case. An 
interrelation appears once again between the 
exercise of  VCCR ’63 rights when a foreign 
national is held in detention and the right to 
family life, as can be perceived in the way the 
ECtHR presents the domestic legal framework 
of  the case including VCCR ’63 individual rights. 
 
There are other recent cases where the 
ECtHR has referred to consular assistance denial 
in connection to ECHR violations, but without a 
specific reference to Article 36.1 (b) VCCR ’63. 
In 2014, in Kim v. Russia, the Court referred to the 
inexistence of  consular assistance in the case of  
a stateless person as creating a ‘particularly 
vulnerable situation’49. Taking into account the 
circumstances surrounding the applicant’s 
detention—with a view to expulsion—said 
48 El-Masri, paras. 248–249, later confirmed in Nashr and 
Ghali v. Italy, paras. 308–310. 
49 Kim v. Russia , no. 44260/13, Judgment of  17 July 2014, 
para. 54. 
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vulnerability was considered to be contrary to 
Article 5 (1) of  the Convention50. 
 
A week after the Lebois v. Bulgaria judgment 
was rendered on 19 October 2017, the ECtHR 
decided upon Azzolina and Others v. Italy, a case of  
torture involving police harsh mistreatment of  
detainees during the G8 summit held in Genoa in 
2001. In that judgment, the Court reinforced the 
qualification of  Article 3 ECHR violations, as 
other rights of  the applicants were violated as 
well, including the right to consular assistance for 
foreign nationals. Specifically, the Court stated 
that ‘Outres les épisodes de violence 
susmentionnés, la Cour ne saurait ignorer les 
autres atteintes aux droits des requérants s’étant 
produites à la caserne de Bolzaneto. Aucun 
requérant n’a pu prendre contact avec un proche, 
un avocat de son choix ou, le cas échéant, un 
représentant consulaire.’51 
 
In short, even if  they are not considered 
fundamental rights, the consular rights of  foreign 
nationals, when detained abroad, certainly 
represent a guarantee for the respect of  the rule 
of  law both in terms of  detention and due 
process, as they ‘recognize and correct any real 
disadvantages that those brought before the bar 
might have, thus observing the principle of  
equality before the law and the courts and the 
corollary principle prohibiting discrimination’52. 
Consular rights grant the detainee access to the 
basic information regarding procedural and 
substantive law for the process he is facing in the 
country of  detention, may speed access to a 
lawyer and/or interpretation facilities in a foreign 
country, and may ease family contact, avoiding 
unacknowledged and/or arbitrary detentions. 
 
The importance of  this inter-rights 
‘connectivity’ is at least being acknowledged at 
European level, as illustrated by the latest case-
law of  the ECtHR. 
 
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS: 
LEBOIS AND BEYOND 
 
50 Idem, para. 56. 
51Azzolina and Others v. Italy, nos. 28923/09 and 67599/10, 
26 October 2017, para. 135. (Official translation not 
available yet.) 
 
Lebois v. Bulgaria was a low profile case on 
its own: a minor crime (breaking into cars with a 
view to stealing items from them) with a minor 
prison sentence (three months’ imprisonment), 
due to a guilty pledge and an agreement with the 
prosecutor, as well as a short detention—having 
served most of  the sentenced time in pre-trial 
detention, the applicant spent just six days in 
prison.  
 
 Also, Lebois was an example of  partial 
compliance with a pilot judgment concerning 
Article 3 ECHR (prohibition of  torture and 
inhuman and degrading treatment) and Neshkov 
and Others v. Bulgaria53. Bulgaria had approved new 
legislation on dedicated preventive and 
compensatory remedies with respect to inhuman 
or degrading conditions of  detention in 
correctional and pre-trial detention facilities. 
These provisions had been in force since 7 
February 2017 but were only applicable to those 
subjects who had spent time in such facilities 
before that date, whether they complained to the 
ECtHR under Article 3 or whether the Court 
declared inadmissible the claim on the basis of  
non-exhaustion of  domestic remedies. The 
applicant should have looked for redress through 
this new legislation encompassing pre-trial and 
conviction detention, whereas no remedy was at 
his disposal for the conditions endured during 
police detention. Besides, he did not raise the 
question in a timely manner. 
 
 In fact, Lebois was a ‘simple’ case 
involving the violation of  Article 8 (right to 
family life, and in this particular case, right to 
contact the family while in prison), which 
extended for twelve days and which was clearly 
established following this part of  the pre-trial 
detention period. 
 
 But the interesting aspects of  the case 
were those initial twelve days and the 
circumstances of  detention during that period. 
Mr Lebois was held deprived of  liberty without 
52 IACHR, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of  October 1, 
1999. Series A No. 16, para. 119. 
53 Neshkov and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 36925/10 and 5 others, 
27 January 2015. 
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informing anyone, and communications were 
restricted from him for a number of  reasons (he 
did not speak Bulgarian and there was no 
interpretation facility available to him; he had no 
money to buy a telephone card or information on 
the country’s telephone system, etc.). Yet the 
Court was unable to condemn Bulgaria for those 
twelve days because the six-month period for 
introducing an application had already expired 
(more than two months earlier). Despite this fact, 
the Court ruled that this twelve-day period and 
the circumstances experienced during that time 
raised ‘a potentially serious issue under Article 8 
of  the Convention’. 
 
The applicant did not raise the question 
of  consular rights, neither in connection with 
Article 8 violation nor related to any sort of  
procedural guarantee of  due process (Article 6 
ECHR), and the Court did not elaborate on the 
issue, although it indirectly introduced the 
question in its ruling.  This mere assertion—
that is, this obiter dictum—is what makes the 
case so relevant to us. The case allowed the Court 
to a) announce obiter dictum that Article 8 was 
potentially violated during a twelve-day period 
when no family contact was allowed or facilitated, 
even though it was time-barred to declare the 
violation itself, and b) to consider, but not to 
discuss, that the violation of  the right to family 
contact was partially dependent on the absence 
of  information on consular rights to the detainee, 
what we have called the ‘almost obiter dictum’. 
 
 The mention of  Article 36 VCHR ’63 and, 
to a certain extent, EU Directive 2013/48 among 
the state of  the law in the case (the Court did not 
mention EU Directive 2012/13) was singular at 
the very least, despite the Court only making a 
general reference to these provisions in the 
assessment of  the alleged violation of  Article 8. 
  
As the Court confirmed in this case, 
individual consular rights (right to be informed 
on the consular rights themselves, right to inform 
 
54 Lebois v. Bulgaria, no. 67482/14, para. 53. 
55 See E. W. Petit de Gabriel, ‘Los Derechos consulares de 
los extranjeros detenidos: ¿nuevas cartas en la baraja de los 
derechos fundamentales’, Revista Electrónica de Estudios 
Internacionales, no. 33 (2016): 9–12 & 18, n. 59, doi: 
10.17103/reei.33.07. 
the consular post, and right to communicate with 
consular authorities) governed the right to 
contact his family. It was through another inmate 
that the applicant was able to contact the French 
Consulate, and not by notification of  the 
detention authorities, who were obliged to 
inform him. It was not until this consular contact 
was established that Mr Lebois could 
communicate and afterwards receive visits from 
his family. As VCCR ’63 establishes, consular 
information must be provided ‘without undue 
delay’; hence, twelve days is too long a period for 
compliance with consular rights ‘without undue 
delay’. In short, the Court considered this twelve-
day period to be already too long.  
 
 For the Court, the right to quickly enable 
contact between the detainee and his family 
avoids ‘the deep anxiety that the disappearance 
of  a family member can cause’, ‘can also amount 
to an important safeguard to prevent arbitrary 
detention’, and ‘takes on an added importance 
when the detainee is an alien whose family may 
be in a different country’54.  
 
In a way, this radiant character is also 
present in the aforementioned ECtHR case law, 
as in the El-Masri and Nasr cases, when linking 
Article 5 violations (including violation of  
consular rights as a guarantee of  liberty and 
security right) with Article 8 violations (private 
and family right). Lebois links again—although in 
an almost obiter dictum—the respect for family 
life to consular rights violations.  
 
A difficult article to pass in the VCCR ’6355, 
it has already been connected in current 
accumulated case law with at least the following 
fundamental rights: prohibition of  torture56 (the 
denial of  consular assistance being a contributing 
factor for the violation, in Azzolina and Others v. 
Italy, 2017, by the ECtHR), right to liberty and 
security57 (in El-Masri, 2012, and Kim v. Russia, 
2014, by the ECtHR), right to a fair trial58 (in 
IACHR OC-16/99, 1999; Breard, 1998; LaGrand, 
56  Art. 3 ECHR, Art. 4 CFREU, Art. 5 American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), and Art. 7 ICCPR. 
57 Art. 5 ECHR, Art. 6 CFREU, Art. 7 ACHR, and Art. 9 
ICCPR. 
58 Art. 6 ECHR, Art. 47 CFREU, Art. 8 ACHR, and Art. 
14 ICCPR. 
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2001; and Avena, 2004, as alleged by the 
applicants, although unacknowledged by the ICJ; 
and currently alleged in Jadhav, by India), right not 
to be arbitrarily private of  one’s life59 (as a result 
of  a violation of  fair trial guarantees, in IACHR 
OC-16/99), right to respect for private and 
family life60 (in El-Masri, by the ECtHR, and in 
Lebois, by deduction on the ECtHR statement of  
the law in the case). 
 
 Still, further case law is needed to settle 
an interpretation on this intertwined relation 
between ‘classical’ international law—law of  
consular relations—and human rights law. A new 
opportunity is present in the Jadhav case. The ICJ 
will have a chance to address the connection 
between consular rights and due process as a 
fundamental right. India, in its sought 
submissions and remedies, included, inter alia, ‘a 
relief  by way of  restitution in integrum declaring 
that the sentence of  military court arrived at, in 
brazen defiance of  the Vienna Convention rights 
under Article 36, particularly Article 36, 
paragraph 1 (b), and in defiance of  the elementary 
human rights of  an accused which are also to be 
given effect as mandated under Article 14 of  the 
1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, is violative of  international law 
and the provisions of  the Vienna Convention’61, 
and also requested the Court to order Pakistan to 
annul the sentence or not give effect to it in any 
manner.  
 
In this case, and if  a proactive position is 
taken, the ICJ might discuss the relevance of  
consular assistance in terms of  guarantees of  due 
process. India has not alleged violation of  the 
right to family life, but there is a scenario too to 
reflect on: the connection between the denial of  
consular assistance for more than a year, the right 
to a fair process, and the right to contact the 
family, whose demand for a visa to visit the 
detainee, already condemned to death penalty, 
has not been denied but simply ignored. Under 
these circumstances, the domestic appeal review 
could not be presented in hand in Pakistan, and 
it is not clear if  it has been registered in the case. 
 
59 Art. 1 ECHR, Art. 2 CFREU (absolute prohibition of  
death penalty), Art. 4 ACHR, and Art. 6 ICCPR. 
60 Art. 8 ECHR, Art. 7 CFREU, Art. 11 ACHR, and Art. 
The issue could be discussed under the 
‘exhaustion of  local remedies’ rule. 
 
Jadhav presents several similarities with the 
Lebois case, but with a threefold difference: 
consular assistance and family life rights have 
been denied for more than twelve months, and 
not days; it is a grave criminal case, risking 
execution as a death penalty sentence has already 
been pronounced; and last but not least, the ICJ 
is certainly not a human rights court.  
 
Yet, after considering Lebois v. Bulgaria, 
gravity does not seem to be the ECtHR’s main 
reason for addressing the relation between 
consular rights and protected rights. Although 
any human rights violation must be granted the 
same consideration, in Lebois neither the crime 
nor its consequences in terms of  duration of  
detention and imprisonment were extremely 
grave or irreparable. As for the time spent before 
family contact was established, such a period was 
not extraordinarily long (compared to situations 
in cases like El-Masri or Jadhav, for example). But, 
for the Court, those twelve days—that is, the 
amount of  days that went by until consular 
contact was satisfied—amounted to ‘a potentially 
serious issue under Article 8 of  the Convention’. 
The human rights violation (contact with a family 
member, as an expression of  the right to private 
and family life according to Article 8 ECHR) 
ended the very moment consular contact was 
achieved. Should consular rights have been 
respected from the very moment of  detention, 
then no Article 8 violation would have taken 
place. 
 
In Lebois, the special situation of  being a 
foreign national, not having translation services 
available nor specific indication on how the 
communication system inside the detention 
facility worked, coupled with the difficulty to get 
a phone card due to lack of  money—all those 
facts constituted special circumstances for the 
Court and made the situation a risky one. Being 
a foreigner does not diminish the conditions to 
be fulfilled for a claim in order for it to be 
17 ICCPR. 
61 Jadhav case (India v. Pakistan), ICC, Application instituting 
proceedings, para. 60 (2). 
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addressed by the European Court of  Human 
Rights (a foreign national is not exempt from 
exhaustion of  domestic remedies62), but it does 
increase the burden on the state to guarantee 
certain rights, such as legal detention, due process, 
or family life. 
 
This path leads us to understand the 
consular rights of  foreign nationals as a 
consequence and an avowal of  the non-
discrimination provision present in all human 
rights instruments63 . Consular rights guarantee 
that foreign nationals will not be subjected to 
unacknowledged confinement, that they will 
understand the process and the rest of  their 
rights, that they will have access to contact and be 
able to alert their family, that they will at least 
have access to the knowledge of  the system of  
redress available in case of  violation of  their 
rights (either fundamental or not), and so on. The 
guarantee for respect and preservation of  those 
rights lies in having the opportunity to be assisted 
by consular authorities from the very moment of  
detention or arrest. And, thus, consular 
information and communication rights must be 
respected. 
 
We should then conclude that the rationale 
for granting a fundamental right spirit to consular 
rights is not dependent on the gravity of  the 
violation or the irreparable prejudice; rather, it is 
a function of  the non-discrimination guarantee it 
offers. And that is a very powerful argument to 
not disregard those rights. Legal counsellors and 
scholars specialised on migrant population or 
procedural rights should not ignore these 
progressive developments of  consular law, as has 
so often occurred in the past.  
 
Other aspects of  this problem should be 
addressed by adjudication bodies; as, for instance, 
the eventual obligation of  the sending State to 
grant consular assistance to his national should 
he request it—due process guarantees—since 
Article 36 VCCR ’63 does not create such an 
obligation on the sending State: the Convention 
only establishes an obligation of  individual rights 
 
62 Lebois v. Bulgaria, no. 67482/14, para. 41. 
63  Non-discrimination may be a clause which applies 
connected to a guaranteed right (such as in Art. 14 ECHR 
guarantees for the receiving State. Thus, the case 
may be that the individual, once informed of  his 
right to consular contact, and after requesting the 
assistance of  his consular authorities, does not 
actually receive it. Whether this should be 
considered a violation of  the right to due process 
or a violation on the part of  the detainee’s State 
of  nationality (the sending State), and not of  the 
State processing him (the receiving State), has not 
been settled yet neither by the IACHR nor by the 
ECtHR, who missed the occasion to rule on the 
matter in M. and Others v. Italy and Bulgaria.  
 
The issue of  individual rights of  foreign 
nationals became of  concern with the last minute 
adoption of  Article 36 VCCR ’63 on the closing 
day of  the Conference. But in the twenty-first 
century, the focus of  this Article has turned from 
individual to fundamental rights. The first and 
most important arena where these rights must be 
applied and claimed, and its violations repaired, 
is the domestic realm. And that includes all 
domestic legal operators that must be trained to 
be aware of  the relevance of  consular assistance 
rights for foreign nationals in a world of  
migrations. Domestic compliance is the first 
arena to fight for them. 
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